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Abstract
High correlation in failure of information systems due to worms and viruses has been
cited as major impediment to cyber-insurance. However, of the many cyber-risk classes that
influence failure of information systems, not all exhibit similar correlation properties. In this
paper, we introduce a new classification of correlation properties of cyber-risks based on a
twin-tier approach. At the first tier, is the correlation of cyber-risks within a firm i.e. correlated
failure of multiple systems on its internal network. At second tier, is the correlation in risk at
a global level i.e. correlation across independent firms in an insurer’s portfolio. Various classes
of cyber-risks exhibit different level of correlation at two tiers, for instance, insider attacks
exhibit high internal but low global correlation. While internal risk correlation within a firm
influences its decision to seek insurance, the global correlation influences insurers’ decision in
setting the premium. Citing real data we study the combined dynamics of the two-step risk
arrival process to determine conditions conducive to the existence of cyber-insurance market.
We address technical, managerial and policy choices influencing the correlation at both steps
and the business implications thereof.
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1 Introduction
The usual approach to managing information security risk is similar to other business risks, i.e. first
eliminate, then mitigate, absorb and then if possible, transfer. Since eliminating security risks in
today’s environment is not possible, managers deploy protection technologies like firewall, an-
tivirus, encryption, and instate appropriate security policies like passwords, access control, port
blocking etc. to mitigate the probability of a break-in or failure. If the residual risk is manageable
it is absorbed, otherwise, transfered by either outsourcing security or buying insurance.
Though this approach seems appropriate, it creates a widening rift between security experts
who propose employing standardized best practices and deploying homogeneous software to en-
hance system manageability thereby reducing vulnerabilities, versus those, who propose using
cyber-insurance as a means of transferring risks associated with system vulnerabilities. This is
because insurance relies on the principle of independent risks while standardized system environ-
ments by themselves create a global monolithic risk manifested in virtually every standardized
system. Unlike in physical world where risks are geographically dispersed, in information world,
network exploits, worms and viruses span all boundaries. All systems that run standardized soft-
ware and processes are vulnerable, because bugs in them, once discovered, are common knowledge
and can be exploited anywhere. This potentially creates a situation where not only all systems
within an organization could fail by virtue of their being identical and vulnerable to same ex-
ploits, but all similar systems worldwide could fail affecting many organizations simultaneously
as seen in case of worms like SQL Slammer, Code Red etc. Ironically, most techniques for secu-
rity risk mitigation could themselves induce correlated failures as they too are standardized. For
instance, antivirus updates, IDS attack signatures and software patches are all downloaded from
web sources, which, if compromised can in turn compromise millions of systems that depend on
them for their security [3]. Such possibilities should surely cross the mind of an insurer who plans
to offer cyber-insurance to only those businesses which “responsibly” manage their information
system by “timely” updating their antivirus, firewall, IDS etc.
The existence of high correlation in breach or failure of information systems adds a new di-
mension to risk management that has rarely been looked at in the context of information security
[17, 10]. Information security risk management has been studied by Soo Hoo [46], Schechter et al.
[42], Arora et al. [1], Cavusoglu et al. [9] and Gordon et al. [19, 21]. Majuca et al. [26] propose
cyber-insurance as an effective strategy for security risk management. They study the evolution of
cyber-insurance market citing moral hazard and adverse selection as the primary concerns. Ogut
et al. [30] and Kunreuther et al. [25] discuss interdependent risks between firms and their suppliers.
Yet, most studies in this area have not explicitly modeled correlated risks and the impediments
they cause to cyber-insurance except Bo¨hme [4] and Geer et al. [17]. In the insurance and actu-
arial literature, the research on aggregation of correlated risks and extreme value theory (EVT)
is abundant [14]. However, the research in that area has not focused on modeling correlated risks
within a single firm seeking insurance. In this paper, we explicitly identify cyber-risk classes that
affect internal correlation in failure and model its effect on the cyber-insurance market in general.
While global risk correlation influences insurers’ decision in setting the premium, the internal
correlation within a single firm influences its individual decision to seek insurance. A risk-averse
firm prefers low variance of loss and hence low correlation of failure amongst its internal systems.
This paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first attempt to separately identify the internal
(within a single firm) and global (across multiple firms) correlation of cyber-risks and to estimate
their combined effect on the presence of cyber-insurance market. Moreover it contains as well the
first empirical approach to measure correlation in cyber-insurance.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the source of
correlation of IT risks and explains how different classes of risk vary in terms of relative importance
of internal and global risk correlation. Section 3 proposes a comprehensive equilibrium model
for the cyber-insurance market. The model captures specific features of information assets and
includes both types of risk correlation as exogenous parameters. A simulation experiment in the
same section demonstrates under which configurations of internal and global correlation a cyber-
insurance market may thrive. The second main contribution of this paper is discussed in Section
3
4, where we present a method to empirically estimate the size of correlation from distributed
honeynet data. We give broad estimates for global and internal correlation, compare different
models of correlation structure, and address requirements for future data collection to yield more
valid and reliable results. The concluding Section 5 discusses the lessons learnt on methodological,
technical, managerial and policy dimensions.
2 The Correlated Nature of IT Security Risks
Due to significant homogeneity and presence of dependencies in computer systems their failure is
highly correlated. Recent spate of Internet worms like MS-Blaster and Sasser have highlighted
this very threat. These worms exploited vulnerabilities present in ubiquitous Microsoft Windows
operating system to infect millions of computers worldwide. Computer viruses like worms are also
highly contagious. Using email to spread,Mydoom virus compiled for Win32 platform – generic for
Windows operating system – was able to infect an estimated million computers worldwide within
5 days of its release [49]. Although worms and viruses receive maximum media attention, other
factors that can cause significant economic damage to a firm’s information system include, insider
attacks, spam, configuration errors, hardware failure, software bugs, and theft among others [20].
2.1 Classes of Cyber-Risk and Correlation
While individual firms care about correlated failure of systems only within their own network, the
insurance companies are concerned about global correlation in their entire risk portfolio because
that affects the risk premium they charge individual firms. Interestingly, different classes of cyber-
risks exhibit different correlation properties (see Table 1).
Table 1: Examples for different kinds of cyber-risk correlation
Global correlation ρG
Internal correlation ρI Low High
High Insider attack Worms and viruses
Low Hardware failure Spyware/phishing
The failure of a computer within a firm due to hardware problem is likely neither influenced
by, nor is it expected to influence failure of other computers in the same firm or other firms, unless
defective computers belong to same faulty production batch. Hardware failures can therefore
be considered to exhibit low intra-firm correlation (henceforth ρI) and low global correlation
(henceforth ρG). Insider attacks exhibit high ρI but low ρG because an insider who is abusing his
privileges, like admin password, can affect almost all computers within his administrative domain
but cannot compromise computers outside his domain [43]. In contrast, software attacks involving
user interaction, such as phishing or spyware, have high ρG and low ρI because a few careless
employees in many different firms may respond to a phishing email or install a new game at
work thereby infecting or compromising their system. However, all such employees are likely not
clustered within a single firm. Typically, worms and viruses exhibit both high ρI and ρG because
they are seldom contained within a single network.
The research in network security area is striving to develop techniques to contain spread of
worms and viruses by automatic generation and distribution of attack signatures [24, 45, 27]. As
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these techniques make use of the concurrence of malicious traffic to identify pattern and extract
signatures, global correlation may be reduced by the maturing of those technologies, but it is
unlikely to vanish completely. On the other hand, internal correlation is unlikely to reduce much
as the local response time required to contain a worm outbreak is too short [47, 23]. O’Donnell et
al. [29] and Chen et al. [10] propose using software diversity to limit internal correlation.
2.2 Implications for Cyber-Insurance Policy Design
Reasoning about correlation also sheds new light on existing cyber-insurance products. The leading
providers of cyber-insurance in the market today are AIG and Lloyd’s of London. Table 2 gives a
snapshot of policies on offer from AIG’s NetAdvanatage suite of cyber-insurance products.
Table 2: Different Cyber-Insurance policies from AIG’s NetAdvantage suite
Coverage Product variation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Assets
Information asset coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . × × ×
Network business interruption . . . . . . . . . × × ×
Follow-up costs
Criminal reward fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . × × ×
Crisis communication fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . × × ×
Malicious action
Physical theft of data on hardware . . . . . × × × ×
Identify theft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . × × × × ×
Cyber-extortion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . × × × × ×
Cyber-terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . × × × × × × ×
Liability
Network security liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . × × × ×
Internet professional liability . . . . . . . . . . . × × ×
Web content liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . × × × × × ×
Punitive, exemplary & multiple damages × × × × × ×
Source: AIG, [26]
Majuca et al. [26] justify multiple policies from AIG as a means of product differentiation
to serve different market segments. We concur with them, however, we suspect the rationale
for offering multiple policies in the market may not always be to serve market segments but to
sometimes also proactively segment the market into as many independent risk classes as possible.
As seen from the Table 2, some policies are indeed independent of some others. Moreover, it
is particularly interesting that coverage for asset losses due to generic cyber-risks are always
bundled with funds covering extra expenses. The former risk classes are presumably exposed to
high global correlation, whereas the latter are not (criminal rewards are paid only once and crisis
communication is dispensable, yet counter-productive, if the whole industry is affected). This kind
of bundling makes sense in terms of risk diversification and in terms of hiding high safety loadings
for correlated risks in the composite premium.
3 Modeling the Market for Cyber-Insurance
The objective of this section is to theoretically analyze the interplay between the two types of
cyber-risk correlation and its effect on the market for cyber-insurance. We present a formal
model, consisting of supply- (Sect. 3.1) and demand-side (3.2) of a cyber-insurance market and
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the equilibrium conditions (3.3). Inference from the model is drawn using Monte Carlo simulation
methods (3.4).
3.1 Supply-Side: Two-Step Risk Arrival with Correlation
In this paper, we propose to address the particularities of cyber-risks in a two-step risk arrival
process. The first step models the aggregation of cyber-risks within a single firm’s network repre-
sented by n computers. The second step aggregates the risks in the portfolio of an insurer issuing
coverage to k similar firms. We allow for correlation on both steps, whereas the extent of cor-
relation may vary between the portfolio level (global correlation ρG) and the firm level (internal
correlation ρI).
3.1.1 Intra-Firm Risk Correlation
The failure of computers within a firm due to a security incident1 can be considered as a collection
of correlated Bernoulli trials such that each computer failure is a coin toss, the outcome of which
depends on outcome of other trials. Computers on a firm’s internal network that have same
configuration have a uniform correlation structure i.e. correlation of failure for any two computers
within the group is same [10]. We chose to model computer failure within a firm using the Beta-
Binomial (BB) distribution, which has been used in computer science literature to model correlated
failure of backup systems [2] and to model failure across multiple versions of software [28]. Other
approaches to model dependent Bernoulli trials include correlation with a latent random trial
[4]. The Beta-Binomial distribution is computed by randomizing the parameter p (probability of
failure) of the Binomial distribution by Beta distribution. This lends Bayesian subjectivity to the
correlation of individual Bernoulli trials, which can be estimated by security analysts based on
the technical and managerial set up in place within a firm.
The probability that X ∼ BB(n, pi, ρI) computers fail in an incident is given by
P (X = x|n, pi, ρI) = B(n− x+ β, x+ α)(n+ 1) B(n− x+ 1, x+ 1) B(α, β) (1)
where α = pi ·
(
1
ρI
− 1
)
, β = (1− pi) ·
(
1
ρI
− 1
)
and B(a, b) =
Γ(a) · Γ(b)
Γ(a+ b)
.
Γ denotes the Gamma function, B is the Beta function, and the parameters include the total
number of computers on the firm’s network n, the (unconditional) probability of failure pi, and
the correlation measure ρI in the range 0 (no correlation) to 1 (perfect dependence).
The main focus of information security research and practice has been on reducing the mean
failure rate pi. However, it is important to observe that a cautiously managed homogeneous
deployment of systems may exhibit low mean yet high correlation in failure. In section 4.3, we
provide empirical evidence to support our claim. Though approaches like intrusion detection
(IDS) are useful in proactively learning about attacks and isolating vulnerable components on the
network in order to reduce chances of cascading or correlated failure [31, 39], frequent false alarms
and exceedingly fast rates of infection have marred their success in practice [16].
3.1.2 Global Risk Correlation
As mentioned above, the insurer has k firms in its risk portfolio. The losses and thus claims at
firms are correlated due to presence of global correlation ρG. We model the distribution of these
correlated risks in the overall portfolio using copulas [14]. Copulas are sophisticated statistical
tools to model dependence of arbitrary probability distributions. In this paper, we use the t-copula
because of its property to model correlation of extreme events [11].
A k-dimensional copula C is a k-dimensional distribution function on the unit space [0, 1]k with
uniform marginal distributions. Any copula C can be used to join k distributions with marginal
1A security incident can be defined as a collection of similar attacks spaced together in time [22].
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distribution functions F1, . . . , Fk to a multivariate distribution F as follows (Sklar’s Theorem, see
[14]):
F (x1, . . . , xk) = C(F1(x1), . . . , Fk(xk)) . (2)
In our model, F1 . . . Fk are the marginal loss distribution functions of k firms in the insurers
portfolio, which happen to be Beta-Binomials with parameters n, pi, and ρI . (In a generalized
case for real-world applications these parameters could vary between firms. We refrain from doing
this since we lack reasonable priors). The individual loss distributions are tied together via the
t-copula Cν,ρG with density function
cν,ρG(u) =
dkν,ρG(t
−1
ν (u1), . . . , t
−1
ν (uk))∏k
i=1 dν(t
−1
ν (ui))
, u ∈ (0, 1)k , (3)
where
• dν is the density function of a univariate t-distribution with ν degrees of freedom,
• t−1ν is the quantile function of a univariate t-distribution with ν degrees of freedom, and
• dkν,ρG is the k-dimensional joint density of a multivariate t-distribution with ν degrees of
freedom and pairwise correlation ρG.
The probability density function of a univariate t-distribution is defined as
dν(x) =
1√
ν · B(ν2 , 12 )
·
(
ν
ν + x2
)(1+ν)/2
. (4)
Once suitable large sets of quantitative data on cyber-losses become available, the choice of the
t-copula can be reevaluated in comparison with other classes of copulas. The gist of our results,
namely the relative contribution of ρI and ρG to the existence of a cyber-insurance market, does
not primarily depend on the type of copula used to model the global dependence structure.
For the simulation of random variables in our complete risk arrival model with its k-dimensional
multivariate Beta-Binomial distribution BB(n, pi, ρI) and dependence structure Cν,ρG , we employ
the multivariate normal variance mixture method described in [11].
3.2 Demand-Side: Information Security Risk Management
The supply-side model presented in the previous section allows an insurer to calculate appropriate
premiums for cyber-risks with a given correlation profile (ρI , ρG). A demand-side model is needed
to analyze when and whether it is optimal for firms to buy insurance coverage at a given premium.
In the following, we introduce a stylized model of the business value of information technology,
and then discuss operable compensation schemes for cyber-insurance contracts with regard to the
intangible nature of information assets and the difficulty to value and substantiate claims.
3.2.1 Modeling Information Assets
The efficacy of a firm’s information system is determined by its ability to store, process and retrieve
information in an efficient manner. While some industries like e-commerce depend completely on
their information systems, other industries depend on them to a varying degree to carry out their
business. Failure of information system due to an attack or malfunction can severely limit certain
business functions that depend on information storage, processing or retrieval.2 Therefore, most
systems are designed to incorporate some level of redundancy or fault-tolerance at both commu-
nication and storage level. In a typical network setting, clients store information on servers which
distribute it among other servers for consistency, load-balancing and fault-tolerance. Performance
and security are generally competing goals when dealing with information [50]. No redundancy
2Even if fall-back plans exist, continuing core business without IT is accompanied by productivity losses.
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implies higher performance and low security, while backups and consistency-checks enhance se-
curity at the cost of lowering performance [44]. Numerous threshold schemes for the design of
storage systems have been proposed [37]. These schemes have three parameters: n, m and p
(where n ≥ m ≥ p). We assume that the information asset of a firm is divided among n nodes
on its network. Due to presence of some redundancy in the network the entire information can
be recreated with help of any m nodes. Assuming that some dependencies exist among them, at
least p nodes need to be compromised to breach any useful information (where p can also be equal
to 1 in case of no dependency).
Utility
0 n=100
Number of nodes compromised
n-m mp
Integrity
Availability
Confidentiality
 
Figure 1: The fall in utility as a function of nodes compromised
Under this setup we observe the impact of node failure on the firm for each of the three common
protection goals (Figure 1):
Confidentiality: To steal complete information an adversary needs to compromise at least m
nodes. It can steal some information if the number of nodes breached is ≥ p.
Integrity: Information can be restored if number of nodes compromised is no greater than n−m.
Availability: Due to dependencies and interconnection of nodes on the network, the failure of
one node affects other nodes. The degrading effect can be high for nodes which have high
dependencies like print servers, file servers, routers etc, while a stand alone desktop has only
minimal effect.
From the above shown relationship between the number of failed nodes and the enforcement of
security properties, specific loss functions `(x) can be derived. A loss function maps the physical
state (number of node failures) to disutility a firm faces due to that physical loss. Due to the very
nature of information assets it becomes extremely difficult to objectively quantify confidentiality,
integrity or availability of information and the loss caused to the firm due to breach in any/all
of them. For instance, breach of two megabytes out of ten megabytes of trade secret does not
necessarily translate into a 20% breach of confidentiality.
There are some proposals for indirect measures of losses in the literature: Cavusoglu et al. [8]
estimated loss in market value of traded firms due to announcement of security breaches. A
similar study by Campbell et al. [7] reports higher losses in market value for security breaches
where confidential data has been exposed, which is consistent with our understanding of a steeper
decline in utility for this protection goal (see Figure 1). Goldfarb [18] estimated loss in market
share of firms due to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, while not explicitly sizing the attack itself.
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Figure 2: Demand-side model as stylized decision problem: determine the maximum gross pre-
mium γ where a risk-averse firm is indifferent between buying insurance or not. Higher premiums
will thwart a functioning insurance market.
3.2.2 Firm’s Decision to Seek Insurance
In our preliminary analysis we assume a linear loss function `(x) ∼ x (i.e. the dollar loss faced by
a firm is linear in number of its computers affected) and a CRRA3 utility function. A situation
equivalent to risk aversion is also obtained when losses are a function of downtime and failed
entities are being serviced in a maintenance queue, which is a plausible assumption for recovery
processes after computer incidents [10].
A risk-averse utility function is one where a firm prefers low variance of income even when
expected income is smaller than in a high variance alternative scenario. Then the decision of a
firm to seek insurance for a given premium can be illustrated in a stylized two-state model, as
depicted in Figure 2 (cf. [48], among others). Consider a firm with initial wealth I0 = 100, which
it will retain in the good state. In the bad state, however, the firm looses q = 45 of its initial
wealth. Let, bad state and good state occur with probability pi and 1−pi, respectively. The firm’s
pay-out in case of “no insurance” yields a (risk-weighted) utility U1, which fixes the set of pay-out
combinations of equal utility on an indifference curve. This means that all points in the set are
equally preferable for the firm. If the firm was offered an insurance policy at the marginal cost of
E(L) = I0 · q · pi, it could realize a superior utility level U2 > U1 on the line of certainty, where all
pay-outs are independent of the state (“naive insurance” point). The limit case where the pay-out
structure with insurance yields the same utility as no insurance is marked as “marginal insurance”
point. It sets the upper bound for the premium and a comparison with this maximum premium
allows us to decide whether firms seek insurance or not. In our simulation study we extend this
model to a higher number of (n+ 1) states with a probability distribution function depending on
the correlation parameter ρI (see Eq. 1), and we allow for partial insurance.
In a competitive insurance market, firms pay a premium that is marginally greater than the
expected loss in order to avoid exposure to the risk. Due to the unique correlation structure of
cyber-risks it is not certain that the premiums are always economically reasonable. In the next
section we investigate how our models for supply-side (Sect. 3.1) and demand-side (this section)
interact and identify cases where cyber-insurance is practical.
3Constant Relative Risk Aversion, see [36]
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3.3 Market Equilibrium Conditions
In this section, we explore the conditions that need to be fulfilled for a market in cyber-insurance
to thrive. As mentioned before, the economic loss due to breach/failure of an information system
is difficult to calculate and substantiate. However, for insurers to come up with practical policies
it is essential that the risk be objectively and unambiguously defined, therefore, we believe if
claims are linearly dependent on the number of system failure then a policy can be unambiguously
offered and objectively monitored. Based on this simple setup we explore the interaction between
the demand side and the supply side of cyber-insurance.
Given an insurance premium of γ per node, the firm chooses the fraction λ∗ as the amount
of insurance coverage bought for each node on its network, which maximizes its expected utility.
In the limit case λ∗ = 0, the firm decides to buy no insurance at all and bear all risks internally
(self-insurance, see [13]). The firm thus pays a net premium of λ∗ ·γ ·n to the insurance company,
and in case of loss due to failure of x computers it receives a compensation of x · λ∗. However,
premiums are not determined exogenously, they depend on the expected expenditure of insurance
companies to settle all claims in a given period. The insurers’ costs C in a single period can be
expressed as a sum of three components
C = E(L) +A+ i · c . (5)
Where,
• E(L) is the expected loss amount, with L being a random variable.
• A is the sum of all administrative costs, which we assume to be negligible.
• c is the safety capital required to settle all claims if the realization of L turns out to the
²-worst case (² is the probability of ruin for the insurer).
• i is the interest rate to be paid for the safety capital c. The rate should reflect the risk
associated with the business in general and the choice of ² in particular.
Parameters ² and i are exogenous in our model, and we use values of ² = 0.005 and i = 0.1 (similar
to [4]).
Since E(L) solely covers the average case, the importance of safety capital to avoid ruin of the
insurance company is evident. Determining the right amount of c, however, is difficult because it
depends on the tails of the loss distribution L. L itself is a sum of k correlated random variables
modeling the loss amount of each individual firm in the insurer’s portfolio, which is again a sum
of the correlated random variables modeling the risk arrival process at each individual node in
the firm. The shape of the p.d.f. after each of the convolution steps depends on the amount of
correlation, so both ρI and ρG appear in the calculation of premium γ, which makes the derivation
of L in closed form intractable. Consequently, we resort to Monte Carlo simulation methods to
determine the regions in the ρI−ρG plane, where a sound business model to offer cyber-insurance at
reasonable premiums exists. This is equivalent to identifying regions with non-negative consumer
and supplier surplus, therefore yielding positive welfare effects.
3.4 Simulation Results
We first calculated the premium that the insurers need to charge firms to insure risks with certain
correlation properties. Then, taking the premium as given, we calculated the firm’s utility both
with and without insurance to determine when a firm would opt for insurance. The plots in
Figure 3.4 show the premiums, and indicate which regions satisfy the conditions for insurance
market to exist. The results presented in this section are based on a total of 800 million simulation
trials. The upper pair of plots shows firm’s decisions for a risk with probability of failure of 1%
(pi = 0.01), whereas the lower pair assume that losses occur on average in every 10th period (pi =
0.1). The left and right plots differ in the shape parameter of the t-coplua for global correlation
ν. The left side assumes heavy tails (i.e., stronger dependence in the extreme outcomes), whereas
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Figure 3: Red lines indicate the minimum gross insurance premium γ to cover a normalized risk of par
value 1 for varying level of ρI and ρG. White areas are “uninsurable”, green areas indicate regions where
cyber-insurance is practical. pi = prob. of computer failure; ² = prob. of ruin for insurer; I1 = initial
wealth of firm; df = shape of the t-copula ν; n = no. of computers per firm; k = no. of firms in insurer’s
portfolio; σ = coefficient of risk aversion. Results obtained from Monte Carlo simulation with 20,000 trials
per parameter setting.
the right side assumes more moderate tails (i.e., the correlation is located in the center of the
distribution, more similar to what a standard Pearson correlation for Gaussian random variables
would imply). We make this distinctions because financial market and insurance research has
observed that correlation in the tails shows up in a number of risk classes where more and reliable
data exists [14]. The overlaying red lines indicate the marginal premium to cover a risk of par value
1. Therefore each of our “unit firms” would have to pay 100 times that premium to fully cover their
entire network of n = 100 nodes. Dark areas indicate regions in the ρG − ρI plane, where firms
(of varying risk aversion, see legend) would decide to buy insurance, i.e., where a cyber-insurance
market can exists. Empirical research on investment decisions has reported realistic values for the
risk aversion coefficient between 1 < σ < 3. Note that both axes are scaled on a square-root scale
to allow for a better resolution in regions of small correlation.
Regarding the results, we notice that with increase in risk-aversion firms prefer insurance. How-
ever, they prefer not to insure risks if both ρI and probability of failure are low. This is so, because
firms already achieve a kind of risk balancing within their own network and thus do not need to
buy external risk balancing. Insurers, on the other hand, demand higher premium in presence of
high global correlation ρG, which is required to balance a clustered portfolio. Therefore, we see
that only firms with higher risk-aversion demand insurance when ρI is low and premium is high.
Finally, the insurable region deteriorates for small shape parameters (df) of the t-copula, which
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reflects a stronger dependency in the tails of the distribution. Since the entire joint distribution
determines insurability, empirical research is needed to find the most appropriate copula and the
parameterization for different classes of cyber-risks.
Lack of empirical data regarding cyber-insurance claims has often been cited as an impediment
to analyzing cyber-risks. Indeed it is a “new” kind of risk, but if we understand the underlying
risk generating process then we can estimate the risk correlation and thus aggregation. In the
following section, we use real world data on network exploits to estimate the correlation in risk
arrival both at internal as well as global level.
4 Empirical Estimation of Correlation in Risk-Arrival due
to Network Exploits
The existence of correlation in cyber-risks is taken as a plausible presumption in the literature
though the evidence is merely anecdotal. In this section, we use quantitative longitudinal data
on attack intensity to obtain rough estimates for the range of realistic correlation parameters.
Although attack statistics are not likely to provide accurate information about loss amounts, they
can serve as operable proxies for loss events. In this research, we are not primarily interested in
the absolute amounts but rather on the existence of a correlation structure, which is assumed to
originate from the global activity of network exploits like worms and viruses. Therefore, if the
hypothesis of global correlation holds for this particular risk class, then it should be measurable
in the distribution of attacks over time across locations.
4.1 Description of Data
We use honeypot data to measure attack activity. Honeypots are dedicated hosts placed on the
Internet which simulate the interaction of vulnerable systems and thereby pretend to be promising
targets for all kinds of malicious activity. Actually, the honeypot software keeps track of all
network traffic and thus serves as monitoring device for attack activities and exploit strategies.
The literature distinguishes between low and high interaction honeypots [35], which differ in
the degree of reactivity of the simulated system. High interaction honeypots emulate an entire
operating system and are reported to deceive even human attackers working interactively, whereas
low interaction honeypots merely react to the first communication attempts and therefore serve
primarily as trap for automated attacks. As the latter collect more standardized and better
quantifiable data, we use data from the Leurre.com [34] honeynet project that runs dozens of low
interaction honeypot sensors deployed at partner organizations worldwide.4 It has been stated
in previous research that data collected from this kind of honeynet is suitable for monitoring
the activity of malicious software automatically attacking vulnerable systems and/or propagating
through the attacked hosts [33]. Therefore it should serve as a good indicator for the correlation
structure behind our worms and viruses risk class (where we assume both high internal and global
correlation, see Sect. 2.1 above).
The data is principally structured as event series, where records of type (t,L,S, h) denote that
sensor location L has recognized h > 0 hits of port sequence S at time t. Port sequences consist
of one or more ports in the TCP/IP protocol being targeted in a row from a unique source as
identified by the IP address and session5. Port sequences have been reported as a simple and quite
reliable indicator for identifying attack types [35], though there might remain some ambiguity for
short port sequences on popular ports (e.g., port 80 for HTTP or port 22 for ssh). Time t is
measured in units of calendar days according to GMT. The raw data contains 183,000 events from
35 sensor locations6 in the time period between February 2003 and September 2005. Hits h are the
4The raw data and the complete list of partners is kept confidential. Only affiliates to partner organization have
access to aggregated data for research purpose.
5An IP address may reappear in different sessions because multiple hosts behind a NAT (Network Address
Translation) router can attack using the same IP address
6Most partners run more than one sensor in their sub-net.
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absolute number of incoming traffic from unique hosts. For certain analyses we use attacks instead
of hits, where an attack denotes a nonzero number of hits per unique combination of (t,L,S).7
Further, the intensity is defined as the average number of hits per attack.
Immediate data analysis was impeded by some inconsistency of data across time. For instance,
partners joined the honeynet sequentially. Since in the aggregate data available from Leurre.com
there was no indicator available to signal the exact uptime of individual sensor locations, the
challenge in data selection lied in approximately identifying sensor downtimes, marking these
periods as missing values and correctly accounting for them in the analysis to diminish the risk
of spurious correlation due to a misinterpretation of sensor downtimes. Therefore, we applied
the following data cleaning steps to generate our final data set for the subsequent correlation
estimations:
1. Visually identified the most dense time period of 15 months between June 2004 and August
2005 and excluded all data outside this window (only 7% of the events were dropped).
2. The remaining data was aggregated by total hits per sensor location and month. Sen-
sor/month pairs with no hits were removed.
3. For each sensor the average hit rate per month was computed (based on the months not
removed from the sample so far).
4. Those sensor/month pairs where the hit rate was below the threshold of 30% of the sensor’s
individual monthly average hit rate were removed. This measure was introduced to eliminate
months with partly up- and downtimes (e.g. some sensors may have gone online or oﬄine
in the middle of a month).
5. Finally, data for sensors with less than 10 months was removed (corresponds to 2/3 of the
15-months window).
The so-reduced set of about 70% of the raw events comprises 13 sensors with relatively dense
and homogeneous data. The remaining sensor locations are distributed across 4 continents (Europe
being slightly over-represented) and include partners in the IT industry, research institutions and
telecommunication providers. Figure 4 shows an example of the resulting data matrix for one port
sequence with daily resolution in time. The attack density histograms are scaled to the individual
sensor location’s maximum hit rate. The distribution of hits across sensor locations is given on
the right-hand axis. Plain white blocks result from sensor/month pairs that were excluded in the
data cleaning phase. Note that the downtime-removal is independent of the port sequence, which
contributes to carefully preventing spurious correlation.
4.2 Estimation of Global Correlation
We estimate global correlation for each port sequence independently to reduce the effect of different
underlying risk-arrival processes appearing as a mixture distribution in the data. While analyzing
the state of (in)security of millions of hosts present on the Internet, Burch et al. [6] found that
firewall behavior varied significantly in allowing/disallowing a combination of ports. Based on
their findings we believe that network exploits using different combinations of port sequences will
have varying level of correlation in their ability to successfully target vulnerable hosts.
Directly calibrating the t-copula based global correlation model of Sect. 3.1.2 is not possible
since the data does not indicate how many nodes of an organization were attacked at any time (we
only observe attacks at the honeypots). Therefore we have to resort to simpler risk-arrival models
instead. In this section, we will investigate both Beta-Binomial model (similar to the one presented
earlier for internal correlation, cf. Sect. 3.1.1), and one-factor latent risk model as formulated in [4]
to model global correlation. This dual approach not only allows for an assessment of the amount
of correlation but also sheds light to the question which arrival process suits best to model global
malicious traffic.
7Since event records with h = 0 are omitted by the data source, attacks directly map to events in the raw data.
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Figure 4: Attack data matrix for port 21 (FTP). Hit rate per sensor location across time.
4.2.1 Beta-Binomial Model
In Beta-Binomial (BB) model, the number of attacked sensors xt registering at least one hit of
the port sequence under investigation at day t is modeled as realization of the random variable
X ∼ BB(nt, pi, ρBB) following a Beta-Binomial distribution where nt the total number of sensors
active on day t (see Eq. 1 for the Beta-Binomial distribution function). Different points in time
are assumed to yield independent realizations of X, which concurs with the notion of a stationary
multivariate Bernoulli process (tmax = 457 data points).
This distribution model belongs to the class of Generalized Additive Models for Location, Scale
and Shape (GAMLSS) and can be fitted to data using maximum penalized likelihood8 [38]. Note
that censored (i.e., missing) data is implicitly accounted for by letting nt depend on t. Table 3
reports the resulting estimates for different port sequences S. Port sequences with fewer than 50
attacks were excluded from the analysis because the likelihood function fails to converge for very
small pi (due to lack of variance in the data). However, this implies a small risk that this exclusion
systematically sorts out port sequences with low correlation, which has to be born in mind when
interpreting the results.
According to this model, we found evidence for the existence of global attack correlation in 19
out of 27 port sequences (≈ 70%, using the likelihood ratio test as a decision criterion with prob-
ability of false acceptance pα < .01). The overall amount of correlation remains very small with
a median ρBB of 0.03. Single ports, however, yield point estimates for the correlation coefficient
above 0.1, such as port 22 (ssh) and port 23 (telnet). According to analytical results in the liter-
ature and in the previous section, those levels of correlation can already impede the practicability
of a cyber-insurance market (keeping in mind that the assumptions of the risk model and the
length of an insurance period differ). Nevertheless, please consider these estimates as preliminary
indications that are subject to numerous possible biases due to rigid model assumptions.
4.2.2 One-factor Latent Risk Model
To validate the results and strengthen the evidence on the existence of global correlation, we fit
a second possible model for global attack dependence. In a one-factor model, the probability of
attack for each node is influenced by a latent two-state variable, which can be interpreted as the
8We use a logistic link function for pi and a square-root link for ρBB to keep the parameters in reasonable ranges.
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Table 3: Estimates for global correlation in the Beta-Binomial model
Correlation ρBB Activity
Port sequence pˆi (std. err.) point est. 95% conf. interval AIC attacks intensity
21| 0.43 (0.008) 0.045 0.03− 0.06 1919 ∗∗∗ 2.2 K 5.6
22| 0.50 (0.011) 0.124 0.10− 0.15 2133 ∗∗∗ 2.6 K 7.0
23| 0.07 (0.005) 0.105 0.08− 0.14 1116 ∗∗∗ 350 4.9
25| 0.31 (0.008) 0.038 0.02− 0.06 1820 ∗∗∗ 1.6 K 4.4
80| 0.63 (0.008) 0.045 0.03− 0.06 1920 ∗∗∗ 3.2 K 16.0
111| 0.10 (0.005) 0.024 0.01− 0.04 1262 ∗∗∗ 508 3.6
135| 0.72 (0.007) 0.031 0.02− 0.04 1795 ∗∗∗ 3.7 K 122.9
139| 0.59 (0.007) 0.002 0.00− 0.02 1797 3.0 K 22.5
443| 0.18 (0.007) 0.047 0.03− 0.07 1624 ∗∗∗ 914 4.2
445| 0.72 (0.008) 0.057 0.04− 0.07 1865 ∗∗∗ 3.7 K 105.9
1080| 0.16 (0.007) 0.094 0.07− 0.12 1633 ∗∗∗ 823 4.1
1433| 0.72 (0.007) 0.038 0.03− 0.05 1828 ∗∗∗ 3.7 K 25.6
3072| 0.08 (0.005) 0.068 0.05− 0.09 1211 ∗∗∗ 421 1.2
3128| 0.06 (0.004) 0.028 0.01− 0.05 1033 ∗∗∗ 315 2.1
3389| 0.12 (0.005) 0.030 0.02− 0.05 1380 ∗∗∗ 613 3.8
4128| 0.03 (0.003) 0.080 0.05− 0.11 651 ∗∗∗ 142 4.0
4899| 0.63 (0.009) 0.068 0.05− 0.09 1966 ∗∗∗ 3.2 K 10.4
80|57| 0.03 (0.003) 0.006 0.00− 0.03 736 176 2.9
135|139| 0.06 (0.003) 0.007 0.00− 0.03 973 284 5.7
135|1433| 0.02 (0.002) 0.016 0.00− 0.05 533 ∗ 101 3.1
139|80| 0.13 (0.005) 0.042 0.03− 0.06 1422 ∗∗∗ 637 5.0
445|139| 0.25 (0.007) 0.016 0.01− 0.03 1687 ∗ 1.3 K 5.2
80|57|21| 0.02 (0.002) 0.012 0.00− 0.03 502 92 3.0
135|445|80| 0.01 (0.002) 0.013 0.00− 0.04 414 69 2.3
135|445|139| 0.06 (0.004) 0.021 0.01− 0.04 992 ∗∗ 286 3.5
139|445|80| 0.14 (0.005) 0.030 0.01− 0.05 1443 ∗∗∗ 690 2.5
135|445|139|80| 0.01 (0.002) 0.013 0.00− 0.04 371 58 2.4
Significance codes for likelihood ratio test (LRT) between Beta-Binomial model and uncorrelated Bino-
mial model: ∗ = pα < .05, ∗∗ = pα < .01, ∗ ∗ ∗ = pα < .001; residual deg. of freedom: 455
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Figure 5: Theoretical probability density functions of correlation models for varying ρBB and ρ0.
activity state of a global attack source. Hence, the number xt of attacked nodes at time t is a
realization of the random variable X, where
Xt(nt, p, ρ0) =
nt∑
L=1
RL (6)
with RL being Bernoulli variables for each sensor location L with total probability of attack
P (RL = 1) = pi. All RL correlate with a latent systemic risk variable R0, where
P (R0 = 1) = P (RL = 1) = pi ∀ L ∈ {1, . . . , nt}. (7)
We further assume a Pearson product-moment correlation ρ0 ∈ [0, 1] between R0 and each RL, so
that
ρ0 =
E [(R0 − E(R0)) · (RL − E(RL))]
SD(R0) · SD(RL) . (8)
As shown in [4], the distribution function of X can be expressed as a mixture of two Binomial
distributions:
P (Xt = x|nt, pi, ρ0) = pi · BN(x, nt, pi + (1− pi) · ρ0) + (1− pi) · BN(x, nt, pi · (1− ρ0)) (9)
with BN(k, n, p) =
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k .
As in the previous model, we assume a stationary process with independent realizations of X
across time. Note that the total attack probability pi is equivalent to the same parameter in
the Beta-Binomial model, whereas ρ0 is not directly comparable to ρBB. A comparison of the
probability density function for attack counts between the Beta-Binomial and the latent factor
risk model is depicted in Figure 5 for fixed n = 50 and pi = 0.2.
Fitting the one-factor model to data requires an iterative approach, because the (assumed)
latent risk factor R0 cannot be observed directly. We employ the expectation maximization (EM)
algorithm [12], which alternates until convergence between the E-step, where a prior for the latent
variable is updated, and the M-step that finds the most likely model parameters based on data
and the current assumption for the latent variable. In the E-step, we use the Bayes theorem to
compute a vector pt of the probabilities that R0 = 1 at time t:
pt =
pi · BN(xt, nt, pi + (1− pi)) · ρ0
BN(xt, nt, pi + (1− pi) · ρ0) + BN(xt, nt, pi · (1− ρ0)) (10)
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This, however, does not yet assure that the constraint in Eq. 7 holds after every E-step. In
estimation experiments on simulated data we realized that the convergence properties can be
improved by leveling the average of pt to pi. In order to avoid the values of pt to move out of the
bounds for probabilities [0, 1], we implement the correction step as an additive shift of the logistic
transform of pt. Hence,
pˆt = f−1 (f(pt) + d) with f(u) = log
u
1− u and f
−1(v) =
ev
ev + 1
. (11)
The correction offset d is determined numerically in each iteration so that
∑tmax
t=1 pˆt = tmax · pi. In
the M-step, a typical maximum likelihood approach is pursued to compute the new parameters:
(pˆi, ρˆ0) = arg max
tmax∑
t=1
log [ pˆt · BN(xt, nt, pi + (1− pi) · ρ0) + (1− pˆt) · BN(xt, nt, pi · (1− ρ0)) ]
(12)
The estimates of the one-factor latent risk model are reported in Table 4. In contrast to the
previous model, the EM algorithm converges also for port sequences with few observations. We
still do not report sequences with less than 50 observed attacks because an interpretation would
be misleading. However, as computing the asymptotic distributions of the parameter estimates
is not as straight-forward, no confidence intervals are given and we had to resort to a simulation
method to obtain critical values for the hypothesis test that true ρ0 > 0. p
(S1)
α is computed from
EM estimates on N = 1000 random data sets generated strictly from the model assumptions with
pi = pˆi and ρ0 = 0. The reported value is the probability that random data without correlation
yields an estimate ρ˜0 equal or greater to the one reported from actual data. However, to exclude
the possibility that positive correlation coefficients occur as an artifact of the lack of fit of the
stylized model, we ran a second simulation experiment (again, N = 1000 for each port sequence)
where the random data was generated with individual piL for each sensor location – thus reflecting
the differences in attack exposure between sensor locations (see Fig. 4) – and with exactly the
same structure of missing data as in the original data set. Hence, p(S2)α is a more critical metric
that captures part of the modeling error as well. It thus can be seen as a robustness check.
Using the most critical criterion, i.e., highly significant LRT, and both p(S1)α and p
(S2)
α < 0.01,
19 out of 35 port sequences (≈ 54%) provide evidence for attack correlation. The median ρ0 = 0.18
is somewhat higher than the median for ρBB with single peaks range up to about 0.30.
4.2.3 Comparison of Models for Global Correlation
With both models estimated on the same data, we are able to compare the results and gain better
insight into the structure of daily event series of attacks on the Internet. A graphical comparison
is displayed in the scatterplot of Figure 6. The almost perfect correspondence of total attack
probability pi between both models is not really surprising (left graph). It is more noteworthy that
also the correlation estimates ρBB and ρ0, albeit on different scales, show a clear linear dependence.
This finding supports the evidence for correlation in global automated network attacks across time
and renders it less likely that the correlation is spurious due to random artifacts of notoriously
suboptimal model assumptions.
Though both models are suboptimal because of a reduction to two parameters only, one might
ask, which of the two alternative models suits better to explain the correlation structure of the data.
Since both models are not nested, and completely different estimation methods were employed, a
rigorous comparison is nontrivial. For a first impression, we looked at individual port sequences
and plotted their probability density functions as shown in the leftmost plot of Figure 7. We
use kernel smoothers to hide the discontinuities due to varying nt. The dark solid line shows the
observed attack density. It is evident that a Binomial fit (light solid line) underestimates the tails
of the actual distribution, which is a clear sign for the existence of some amount of correlation.
Next, compare the Beta-Binomial best fit (dotted line) with the latent factor risk model. Both
allow for fat tails, but the latent factor models appears to be superior, because it does not shift the
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Table 4: Estimates for global correlation in the latent factor model
Correlation estimate Activity
Port sequence pˆi ρˆ0 p
(S1)
α p
(S2)
α AIC attacks intensity
21| 0.42 0.26 0.000 0.000 1708 ∗∗∗ 2.2 K 5.6
22| 0.48 0.33 0.000 0.000 1885 ∗∗∗ 2.6 K 7.0
23| 0.05 0.25 0.000 0.000 1012 ∗∗∗ 350 4.9
25| 0.29 0.23 0.000 0.000 1670 ∗∗∗ 1.6 K 4.4
57| 0.02 0.06 0.966 0.662 538 ∗ 114 3.6
80| 0.62 0.25 0.000 0.000 1722 ∗∗∗ 3.2 K 16.0
111| 0.09 0.17 0.002 0.000 1190 ∗∗∗ 508 3.6
135| 0.70 0.27 0.000 0.000 1619 ∗∗∗ 3.7 K 122.9
139| 0.58 0.17 0.795 0.000 1698 ∗∗∗ 3.0 K 22.5
443| 0.17 0.23 0.000 0.000 1482 ∗∗∗ 914 4.2
445| 0.71 0.28 0.000 0.000 1647 ∗∗∗ 3.7 K 105.9
1080| 0.13 0.28 0.000 0.000 1454 ∗∗∗ 823 4.1
1433| 0.69 0.28 0.000 0.000 1628 ∗∗∗ 3.7 K 25.6
3072| 0.07 0.22 0.000 0.000 1113 ∗∗∗ 421 1.2
3128| 0.05 0.18 0.000 0.000 965 ∗∗∗ 315 2.1
3389| 0.11 0.20 0.000 0.000 1285 ∗∗∗ 613 3.8
4128| 0.02 0.22 0.000 0.000 588 ∗∗∗ 142 4.0
4899| 0.62 0.30 0.000 0.000 1710 ∗∗∗ 3.2 K 10.4
8080| 0.09 0.12 0.707 0.000 1151 ∗∗∗ 497 3.1
28934| 0.02 0.03 0.998 0.038 531 104 1.3
80|57| 0.03 0.12 0.164 0.146 713 ∗∗∗ 176 2.9
135|139| 0.05 0.14 0.065 0.000 935 ∗∗∗ 284 5.7
135|445| 0.21 0.12 0.981 0.000 1463 ∗∗∗ 1.1 K 7.7
135|1433| 0.02 0.12 0.041 0.001 515 ∗∗∗ 101 3.1
139|80| 0.11 0.21 0.000 0.000 1311 ∗∗∗ 637 5.0
139|445| 0.45 0.16 0.857 0.000 1684 ∗∗∗ 2.3 K 8.2
139|1433| 0.02 0.07 0.925 0.716 464 ∗ 86 1.7
445|80| 0.05 0.10 0.882 0.214 843 ∗∗∗ 242 2.7
445|139| 0.24 0.19 0.034 0.000 1582 ∗∗∗ 1.3 K 5.2
80|57|21| 0.02 0.13 0.011 0.006 480 ∗∗∗ 92 3.0
135|445|80| 0.01 0.12 0.022 0.007 398 ∗∗∗ 69 2.3
135|445|139| 0.05 0.18 0.000 0.000 928 ∗∗∗ 286 3.5
139|445|80| 0.12 0.19 0.000 0.000 1350 ∗∗∗ 690 2.5
57|1433|445|139| 0.03 0.11 0.230 0.136 665 ∗∗∗ 160 3.0
135|445|139|80| 0.01 0.12 0.022 0.008 357 ∗∗∗ 58 2.4
Significance codes for likelihood ratio test (LRT) between latent factor model and
Binomial model (i.e, ρ0 = 0): ∗ = pα < .05, ∗∗ = pα < .01, ∗ ∗ ∗ = pα < .001;
residual deg. of freedom: 455
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Figure 6: Comparison of parameter estimates between Beta-Binomial model and latent factor
model. Each point represents one port sequence. The regression line is computed only on port
sequences with significant correlation (LRT pα < 0.01) in both models.
probability mass to small realizations of X, as in the Beta-Binomial model. Therefor we can state
that, at least for this port sequence, the assumption of one latent factor being the main source for
correlation is more plausible than Bayesian uncertainty about pi, as implied in the Beta-Binomial
model. A similar tendency could also be observed in other port sequences, however this kind of
visualization becomes less clear for extreme (high or low) total attack probabilities pi.
But is one factor enough or can be do even better by allowing for more factors? To explore
this question, we computed the entire correlation matrix between sensor locations using pairwise
case exclusion to account for missing values. The correlation matrix was then fed into a principal
component analysis (PCA) to evaluate the dimensionality of the data. The eigenvalues, as a
measure of explained variance per factor, suggest five factors with eigenvalue > 1. However, the
first of them is absolutely dominant (see middle plot of Fig 7). Therefore, the gain in explanatory
power by adding more factors would be limited – the one-factor model does already quite well.
Finally, this assertion gets even more support by the very good correspondence between the
most likely realization of the (assumed) latent factor, as given from the last vector pˆt of the EM
algorithm, and the first principal component extracted by the PCA (right plot of Fig. 7).
Future work should relax the stationarity assumption and analyze autocorrelation in the data
and the latent factor. This could provide valuable insights for insurance business because after a
system is hardened against a particular vulnerability, the persistence of attack traffic to exploit
that hole can be ignored. Another important goal would be to improve the data quality, both
in terms of consistency (across time and sensors) and quality (using worm fingerprints instead of
port sequences to identify separate risk classes).
4.3 Estimation of Internal Correlation
Unaware of internal network configuration at individual sensors domains, it is not straightforward
for us to estimate the internal correlation of failure. However under two key assumptions, stated
below, we are able to specify a model for internal correlation that we estimate.
1. Every computer that is successfully infected by a network exploit turns into an attacker itself
and targets other computers.
2. With high probability an attacking computer targets other computers on its internal network.
The first assumption is especially true of worms, as worms by definition seek, infect and recreate
themselves at vulnerable computers. Network exploits that are mounted by a human attacker
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Figure 7: Drill-down to port sequence 21 (FTP): Observed and estimated probability density func-
tions (left); eigenvalues of pairwise correlation matrix as measure of the dimensionality (middle);
correspondence of estimated latent risk factor pˆt after convergence of the EM algorithm with the
first extracted factor of a principal component analysis (PCA, right)
himself or through a command and control channel like a botnet also satisfy this assumption to
certain extent, because attackers gain is monotonic in the number of computers it can infect. The
second assumption pertains to the scanning approach that a worm or an attacker employs to seek
vulnerable systems. Since the publication of article on Warhol worms in 2002 by Staniford et al.
[47] most worms have used subnet permutation scanning. In that article, authors hypothesized
that subnet permutation scanning is superior to random scanning of IP address space in seeking
potential targets, and since then we have seen almost all worms using some form of intelligent
scanning. Human attackers generally scan for other vulnerable hosts on the network using an
array of attack tools [40, 32]. Therefore, our second assumption is reasonably correct, however,
if the internal network at a sensor domain is sufficiently partitioned via use of VLANs, internal
firewall, access control lists, system and software diversity, such that infected hosts on the network
are unobserved by the honeypot then, our estimate for correlation could be biased. The direction
of bias will be clear after the model specification.
Under the above stated assumptions, the honeypots at a sensor location are able to observe
all infected computers on their internal network L, and can thus count the number of infected
computers xL,t at time t. In the framework of Beta-Binomial model (cf. Sect. 3.1.1) of computer
failure on the internal network, we are able to observe realizations x of number of computer failure
per domain over a period of time. Since the size of host population at each sensor domain is not
known9 to us, we resort to host discovery approaches of actively scanning the entire host space to
identify active hosts at each domain. The results of the estimation are reported in Table 5. The
three rightmost columns show summary statistics on the domain’s network size, where column
“active” reports the number of unique hosts responding to our probes. This values has been used
as a fixed nL of the Beta-Binomial model. Column “attacking” indicates the total number of
unique internal attack sources observed in the entire time frame. A subset of these sources is
counted as xL,t for each day. Finally, “IP range” indicates the theoretical size of the internal
network as obtained from the subnet mask. Note that we report the residual degrees of freedom
for each domain since it depends on the individual uptime (N.B. the number of cases in each fitted
model is given as df + 2).
Only five (out of 13) domains reported a considerable number of attacks from within their own
network, which may either be attributed to differences in the quality of network administration or
merely the fact than in some locations the sensors are placed outside the site’s firewalls. For all of
these five locations, a Beta-Binomial model with nonzero correlation fitted the data significantly
9Size of network host space is not a valid proxy for number of hosts.
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Table 5: Estimates for internal correlation in the Beta-Binomial model
Domain Correlation ρI AIC / LRT Network size (# of hosts)
number pˆi point est. 95% conf. int. (residual df) active attacking IP range
1. 0.00 0.0045 0.00− 0.01 123 (302) ∗ 63 9 256
2. 0.06 0.1050 0.09− 0.12 2260 (363) ∗∗∗ 149 789 65.5 K
3. 0.00 0.0040 0.00− 0.00 1926 (395) ∗∗∗ 2.7 K 275 65.5 K
4. 0.01 0.0166 0.01− 0.02 4925 (455) ∗∗∗ 8.9 K 8.1 K 65.5 K
5. 0.00 0.0000 0.00− 0.00 730 (455) ∗∗∗ 65.0 K 105 65.5 K
Significance codes for likelihood ratio test (LRT) between Beta-Binomial model and uncorrelated Bino-
mial model: ∗ = pα < .05, ∗∗ = pα < .01, ∗ ∗ ∗ = pα < .001; Basis: daily data of all port sequences;
domains were sorted by active hosts and labeled with ordinal numbers for confidentiality reasons
better than an independent Binomial process10. However, the resulting correlation coefficients are
much smaller than in the corresponding Beta-Binomial model for global correlation (cf. Table 5).11
It is particularly noteworthy that the size of internal correlation differs significantly between net-
works. We interpret this as a joint outcome of a) differences in network structure and management
quality and b) biases in the estimation of the total number of hosts in each domain12. Future
research on more reliable data should aim to disentangle the (interesting) substantial component
(a) from measurement error (b).
As mentioned before, we are unaware of internal network management at any of the sensor
locations, therefore, our estimates for ρI and pi are only indicative and should not be considered
definitive or conclusive. However, our approach is sound and can be used by a network adminis-
trator with contextual knowledge to determine correlation on his network. Specifically, given time
series (or discrete event) data about node failure on a network the internal correlation ρI can be
determined. Ideally, a network administrator would like to know correlation properties of different
services running on the network like FTP, RPC, various messaging and P2P file sharing services,
such that he can specifically allow or disallow certain service(s) based on the risk of correlation. At
the same, employing the IDS, VLAN, access control and internal firewalls to limit risk correlation
for all services.
4.4 Validity and Robustness
Our analyses of correlation parameters ρI and ρG is an important first step in identifying risk
classes. Honeypots have proved to be successful in analyzing network-based exploits [34]. There-
fore, the rate and severity of attacks observed by honeypots can serve as a reasonable proxy for
rate and severity of computer failure on a network. However, as the state of computers on a
network is often too dynamic – changes when new software are installed and services enabled –
the relatively stationary state of a honeypot may not be truly reflective of the computers it is
representing. Therefore, the honeypots may misjudge attacker behavior. Furthermore, the limited
interaction capability of honeypots in our data set may bias our results toward low interaction (low
level) attacks. Specifically and less importantly, in the estimation of ρI we may have mistaken the
10Here we interpret the outcome of the LRT but we ran further simulation experiments with random uncorrelated
data to gain confidence and assure the correctness of our estimation procedure.
11Note that the two approaches of measuring correlation are exact dual of each other, in case of ρI we observe
sources of attack, whereas, for ρG we count attacked sensors.
12Domains 2 and 5 are visibly prone to such errors, as fewer active than attacking hosts might signal changes
in the network structure between data observation and size estimation, and 65+K active hosts may result from
firewalls responding to our probes. We decided not to exclude these cases to raise awareness for possible pitfalls in
the proposed measurement method.
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size of the networks if they have not remained constant over time. In spite of all the limitations,
our estimation results for ρI and ρG are reasonable and indicative of presence of correlation at
both global as well as intra-firm level.
5 Discussion
5.1 Summary of Results
In this paper, we have introduced a new classification for correlation properties of cyber-risks
based on a twin-tier approach. We have shown how the two-step risk arrival process for cyber-
risks can be incorporated in an economic model that takes into account the specific properties
of both information assets and IT risks, namely systemic interdependence of loss events within
and between firms. This model has been employed in simulation analyses to infer parameter
constellations where a market for cyber-insurance can exist in theory and where it cannot.
Our simulation results indicate that cyber-insurance is best suited for classes of risk with high
internal and low global correlation. This is so, because low internal correlation allows firms to
realize self-insurance in their own network and thus limits demand for cyber-risk transfer. High
global correlation, in turn, causes imperfect risk-pooling in the insurers’ portfolios. Consequently,
insurers have to add high safety loadings to the premiums and thus limit the supply for cyber-
insurance.
We used honeynet data from Leurre.com project to estimate correlation in network exploits.
For the estimation of global correlation parameter, ρG, we analyzed correlation of attacks across
multiple globally dispersed honeypots, whereas internal correlation parameter, ρI , was determined
by correlating instances of infected computers on the internal network of the honeypot(s). We
found evidence for correlation in both dimensions, whereas the results for ρG turned out to be
more robust and thus more valid than the results for ρI , which is largely attributed to the nature
of our empirical data. We acknowledge that few assumptions and some data limitations may
potentially bias our results. However, our estimation technique is sound and extensible.
5.2 Implications
Technical, managerial and policy approaches could be developed that can favorably alter the
inherent correlation structure of the market. On the technical side, a stronger emphasis on diversity
of system platforms might be an appropriate measure to counter both internal [10] and global
[4] correlation. Techniques for automatic worm signature generation and distribution should be
perfected, while at the same time, the current practice of unreserved auto-updates of system or
application software should be reconsidered (see also [3]). On the managerial level, the recent trend
to standardization, through outsourcing or other means, may create latent liabilities that have not
yet appeared on the horizon of risk management and thus are not reported on the balance sheet.
Policy makers can address correlation via diversity in several ways. They have indirect control
of the market structure in software markets via competition policy, and/or by making cyber-
insurance compulsory for certain businesses. A direct stimulus with less regulatory burden can
also be given by assigning diversity a higher priority in public procurement. The exact measures
and its likely outcomes, however, are to be evaluated in more targeted research and on the basis
of more appropriate empirical data. This leads us to methodological implications. Apart from the
frequently complained lack or unavailability of data [15], we have experienced in our research that
the (restricted) data sources at our disposal lack basic statistical requirements, such as rigorous and
clear standards as well as consistency over time and comparability between locations. As reliable
longitudinal data on all levels of regard (network traffic, attacks, failure, losses) is indispensable
for sound management of cyber-risks, we see great prospect for interdisciplinary collaboration
between the network monitoring community and econometricians to define ample standards, with
the envisaged types of analysis in mind, similar to those of macro-economic time series.
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5.3 Directions for Future Research
Lack of research in this area could be a reason for why cyber-insurance market has not matured
yet. Mi2g, a reputed security trend analysis and consulting firm, estimates global loss due to cyber
security incidents in upwards of US $200 billion13, while the current cyber-insurance market is
worth only about US $2 billion [26]. We believe that a more detailed analysis of security outcomes
following the correlation among component factors, as we describe, will be helpful in preparing
market friendly coverage policies. In future work, we plan to study different loss functions, payout
choices and their consequent impact on design of cyber-insurance policies.
We propose to partner with insurers in estimating the impact of technical and business pro-
cesses on the level of internal as well as global correlation. The partnership is likely to yield more
refined metric for correlation and their direct correspondence to systems in place like software di-
versity, network management and access control. Going further, insurance companies can demand
critical evaluation of technologies and processes, which in turn would yield new insights for more
secure and less correlated environments. Finally, the role of insurers in the assumed markets for
security vulnerabilities [41, 5] has to be modeled.
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